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THE CASE AGAINST NO-CONDUCT
MONOPOLIZATION
LUTHER C. McKINNEY*
Complex, costly industrial restructuring lawsuits are currently the sub-
ject of considerable handwringing. 1 These cases had their origins in the
activist atmosphere of the '60s and represent an effort to reshape the busi-
ness community more in the model of "perfect competition," a highly
theoretical classroom concept. 2 Since many economists now doubt that the
general welfare will be advanced by deconcentrating American enter-
prises,' it is not surprising that these experimental cases are hopelessly
bogged in unending litigation. Some commentators would circumvent this
problem by continuing the restructuring movement through the adoption
of a no-fault monopolization standard. They would ease the burden of the
prosecutors rather than confess error and urge that no more such suits be
filed. Sober thought ought to be given to the adequacy of such counsel.
This may be another instance where the lure of administrative expediency
is a poor substitute for a thorough study of economic effects.,
The question is where does the truth lie? From whence do some of the
notions arise? Are they, in fact, grounded in economic theories which are
supported by reliable empirical evidence or are they appealing, but super-
ficial, views of the world with little or no scientific basis?
As it turns out, the reasoning of the reformists is fundamentally flawed
by the economic jargon upon which they rely. The economic assumptions
* Senior Vice President-Law and Corporate Secretary, The Quaker Oats Company.
£ See, e.g., Dougherty, Elimination of the "Conduct" Requirement in Government Mon-
opolization Cases: A Proposed Revision of the Sherman Act, 10 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. Rxv.,
No. 3, 37 (1978); Fox, Monopoly and Competition: Tilting the Law Towards a More Competi-
tive Economy, 37 WASH. & LEE L. R a. 49 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Fox]; Chronicle of
Wasted Time, Wall St. J., Oct. 16, 1979, at 20, col. 1 (editorial). Cases often mentioned in
this context include: United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., Civ. No. 74-1698 (D.D.C.,
filed Nov. 20, 1974); United States v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., 69 Civ. 200 (S.D.N.Y.,
filed Jan. 17, 1969); Exxon Corp., No. 8943 [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 20,388 (FTC, issued July 17, 1973); Kellogg Co., No. 8883, [1970-1973 Transfer
Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 19,898 (FTC, issued April 26, 1972).
2 Perfect competition assumes a large number of buyers and sellers so that no one actor
can influence price, easy market entry and exit, homogeneous products, perfect knowledge,
full capacity operation, and that all other factors remain equal, including population, in-
comes, tastes, and prices of substitutes. Backman, Holding the Reins on the Trust Busters,
in ANTITRUST PoLicY ON ECONOMIc WELFARE 17 (Michigan Bus. Papers No. 56, W. Sichel ed.
1970) [hereinafter cited as Backman].
See, e.g., Dewey, The New Learning: One Man's View, in INDUSTRAL CONCENTRATION:
-THE NEW LEARNING 1-14 (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann and J. Weston eds. 1974); McGee,
Efficiency and Economies of Size, in id. at 55-97; Weston & Lustgarten, Concentration and
Wage-Price Change, in id. at 307-332. See generally note 14 infra. See also McKinney, Shared
Monopolies and the FTC's Cereal Case, 47 ANTITRUST L.J. 1127, 1133-34 (1979).
4 In Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), the Supreme Court
struck down a per se rule against nonprice vertical restrictions on distribution, emphasizing
that the concern of the antitrust laws is with economic realities, not administrative ease.
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underlying the reformists' proposals have not been adequately accepted in
the economic community; empirical evidence has not proven their exist-
ence; and most of these assumptions are the product of nonscientific obser-
vations, conjured up during another era, involving an agrarian economy.
This shaky ground is hardly the proper foundation for basic and far-
reaching antitrust reform.
In its recent report, the National Commission for the Review of Anti-
trust Laws and Procedures [NCRALP or Commission] concluded that
some form of no-conduct monopolization standard is desirable and recom-
mended that Congress initiate an inquiry toward that end.5 Procedural
recommendations in the report have become part of the proposed Antitrust
Procedural Improvement Act of 1979. 6 The Commission urged "the adop-
tion of a standard enabling the government to obtain structural relief on a
showing of persistent monopoly power without the need to prove culpable
conduct. . . "I The Commission based this proposal on the belief that
the primary objective of the Sherman Act is "dissipation of persistent
monopoly power" and that such power "can be presumed to be maintained
through deliberate conduct that would violate traditional Sherman [Act]
Section 2 standards. 8
"Bigness as badness" legislation is nothing new, but attempts to get it
through Congress in recent years have been wholly unsuccessful? Un-
daunted, proponents of the current movement press on, advocating legisla-
tive or judicial change. One of them is Professor Eleanor M. Fox, a
NCRALP Commissioner and author of an article setting forth her views
in another part of this issue."0
As its basic premise, Fox's article implicitly assumes a strong and
direct relationship between industry structure and firm performance." In
other words, the structure of an industry determines the performance of
the firms in it. The problem in accepting this supposed relationship is that
its existence has never been proven. Past efforts at empirical verification
I NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES, REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 141-42 (Jan. 22, 1979) [hereinafter cited as
COMMISSION REPORT] reprinted in 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.)
at 40.
See S. 390, in S. REP. No. 96-239, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 142, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
(Special Supp.) at 40.
'Id. at 141, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 40.
The Concentrated Industries Act, S. 2614, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG. REc. 34,104
(1971), and the Industrial Organization Act, S. 3832, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CONG. REC.
24,925 (1972), S. 1167, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 7304 (1973), were never reported
out of committee.
, See note 1 supra.
" Since social welfare is the ultimate concern of society, producers of goods and services
are expected to exhibit good performance in achieving the societal objectives of productive
and allocative efficiency, progressiveness, full employment of resources, and equitable income
distribution. See F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKcar STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 3-
4 (1970) [hereinafter cited as SCHERER].
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have been "inconclusive, conflicting, or tenuous." 2
The principal reason for the dearth of empirical evidence is the inade-
quacy of the structure-performance model to approximate sufficiently the
real world.'" The model is based on applied price theory which itself is
grounded on the dubious norm of perfect competition. In fact, many econo-
mists doubt the utility of this model as a meaningful tool for describing
ideal competition. It fallaciously assumes that consumer tastes remain
constant over time and that all market participants act rationally with
price and profit as their sole motivation. Finally, the model assumes that
each firm produces only a single product in a long-run, static, equilibrium
market. This means that price and income levels, demand, and the struc-
ture of the market cannot change for years at a time.
Just as the one theoretical extreme of perfect competition has no real-
life equivalent, neither does the other extreme of theoretical monopoly. Yet
Professor Fox, in her article, improperly uses "monopoly" and "monopoly
power" interchangeably. The former is an economic concept based on an-
other theoretical model,'5 while the latter term, "monopoly power," is a
legal concept which has a much different meaning. Every departure from
perfect competition permits the deviating firm some power.'6 But it is not
necessarily monopoly power in a legal sense. The Sherman Act is con-
cerned only with monopoly power that allows a firm to control prices or
exclude competition.'
7
The law also distinguishes between whether the firm has acquired or
maintained such power innocently or through predatory behavior.'" Exist-
ing interpretations of the Sherman Act condemn only the predatory ac-
quisition or maintenance of monopoly power. However, some members of
the President's Commission, through the no-conduct standard, would con-
demn the innocent with the predator. They seem to rationalize this change
,2 Stem & Grabner, Competition: Its Meaning and Measurement, in MANAGERIAL ANALY-
sis iN MARKETING 91-92 (F. Sturdevant ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Stem & Grabner].
" See id. at 76-78, 91.
" See, e.g., Backman, supra note 2, at 17-18; Stem & Grabner, supra note 12, at 77;
Wilson, Restrictive Practices, in CoMPzrrON, CARTELS AND THEIR REGULATMON 119 (J. Miller
ed. 1962). See also D. DEWEY, THE THEoRY oF Lhnmircr COMPE=ON (1969).
,1 As a practical matter, there are probably no monopolies comparable to the economist's
model. The government may grant a "monopoly" to a utility, but not without regulating the
prices it charges. In addition, a patent holder may have a "monopoly," but its duration is
finite, and the patentee is limited in the ways it may use its "monopoly." Notwithstanding
government involvement, the "monopoly" held by a railroad is circumscribed by the availa-
bility of substitute modes of transportation.
" Schmalensee, On the Use of Economic Models in Antitrust: The ReaLemon Case, 127
U. PA. L. REv. 994, 1005 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Schmalensee].
'1 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (quoting United States v.
E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956)). However, even this Sherman Act
standard may be overly broad. Schmalensee points out the difference between'short-term and
long-term monopoly power, noting that the presence of the former need not result in excess
profits. Schmalensee, supra note 16, at 1007 n.51.
," United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966).
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on the basis that persistent monopoly power is so pervasive that the cur-
rent antitrust standard cannot deal with the problem. 9
The validity of the assertion that persistent monopoly power is a major
economic problem depends on the definition of "persistent monopoly" and
a review of the data based thereon-important tasks which both Fox and
the Commission have neglected. Moreover, it is not clear to me or some
members of the Commission that such a problem actually exists.
In his separate statement, Commissioner Hatch stated that substantia-
tion as to the existence and extent of the problem is conspicuously absent:
We have not been supplied with even a "guess" about where [the
current law] has failed. In the absence of any factual support and
because of their logical inconsistencies, unanswered questions, and
clear potential for public harm, the "principles" set forth by the
majority should not be accepted by the courts or by the Congress."
One of these unanswered questions concerns proof that the Federal Trade
Commission Act and the other antitrust laws have failed to control the
perceived problem." In light of the fact that such laws were designed to
cure deficiencies in the Sherman Act, such a showing is a logical and
reasonable prerequisite for those demanding wholesale Sherman Act
change.
Areeda and Turner, to whom the advocates of such change look for
support, demonstrate a belief that some monopolies deserve to persist,2
where a competitor gains so-called monopoly power simply by doing the
best job of serving the consumer. This conclusion is consistent with the fact
that consumer welfare, not condemnation of monopoly power per se, is the
focus of the Sherman Act.3 The "whole concept of efficient resource alloca-
tion is built upon the fundamental belief that the consumer is sovereign,"2
and while competition is preferred generally for this reason, restraints of
trade and monopolistic conduct are antisocial only when they have harmed
consumers, not when they add to their welfare.
Currently, by requiring the government or private plaintiff to show that
the defendant possesses monopoly power and has deliberately acted with
" COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 151-54, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
(Special Supp.) at 45-47.
20 Id. at 365, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 104 (separate
statement of Commissioner Hatch with Commissioner Wiggins concurring).
21 The role of the FTC Act is particularly important in view of the Supreme Court's
determination that the Act's application is not fettered by the letter or the spirit of the
antitrust laws. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972). See FTC v. Brown
Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 321-22 (1966).
3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 614-624 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
AREEDA & TURNER].
See R. BORK, THE ANTrTRUST PARADox 20, 50-71 (1978).
24 SCHERER, supra note 11, at 19.
21 See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 563, 571 (1966). At least one commen-
tator argues that this focus is misplaced. Schmalensee, supra note 16, at 1011-16.
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the general intent to acquire or maintain it, section 2 of the Sherman Act
contains both a structural and a behavioral component. Monopoly power
typically turns on the structural variable of market share,2 while the
"willfulness" requirement looks to conduct in that market. This historical
emphasis is a sound one, as examination of conduct as well as structure
results in a more realistic picture of the marketplace and how consumers
are being served.
As justification for moving away from a behavioral standard, the Com-
mission dwells on a belief that such proof "unduly" protracts section 2
litigation and "reduce[s] the effectiveness of structural relief."26 The lat-
ter complaint is a derivative of the first. According to Commissioner Fox:
"At the end of this whole process [extended litigation] the judge and the
teams of lawyers are so exhausted that, if liability is found, relief becomes
a tag-on issue likely to be addressed as a question of appropriate punish-
ment rather than as a central task to restore competition."
27
This statement seems to suggest that the bench and bar, rather than
the laws, fall short. I seriously doubt the accuracy of that indictment, but
even if judges and lawyers are not up to their jobs, it seems to me a
preposterous basis for altering a century of substantive precedent. In any
event, abandoning the conduct requirement may produce only an insignifi-
cant saving of litigation time. Based on my own experience in antitrust
litigation, evidence of conduct will remain in great demand during pretrial
discovery, whether or not a no-conduct liability standard is adopted.2
Commissioner Fox relies on the ipse dixit that the costs of monopoly
make it "almost always in the public interest to dissipate substantial,
persistent monopoly power." 9 She states that monopoly is thought by
most economists to distort resource allocation and lessen consumer wel-
fare." The fact is that assumption of superiority in allocation of resources
under pure competition is subjective, and economies of scale may yield
costs and prices lower under monopoly than under competition. The only
distinction necessarily implied by the pure theory of competition and its
monopoly counterpart is the fact that the monopolist's price exceeds the
cost of producing the last unit of output, while the competitor's equals it.
Professor Fox sweeps aside concern about consumer welfare loss with a
cavalier brush, stating: "I am not concerned about the claim of a possible
" COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 151-52, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
(Special Supp.) at 45.
21 Id. at 340, 897 ANTTRusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 97 (separate
statement of Commissioner Fox).
Is As the Commission's Report notes.* "Such evidence would most likely be relevant to a
definition of markets, a finding of monopoly power in those markets and a determination of
whether or not efficiencies of scale exist in the operation of the defendant." Id. at 153, 897
ANTTRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 45.
" Id. at 341-42, 897 ANTrrRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 97 (separate
statement of Commissioner Fox).
11 Fox, supra note 1, at 57. Again, she is confusing monopoly with monopoly power. See
text accompanying notes 15-17 supra.
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loss of efficiencies. . . . Moreover, the forces of competition, when res-
tored, are likely to bring about efficiency gains." 3' This logic seems circu-
lar. If she would include within the reach of the proposed standard those
monopolies based on economies of scale or individual scarce resources,
what kind of remedy would she offer? Areeda and Turner, upon whom she
relies heavily, see these as irremediable monopolies and, absent predatory
behavior, properly exempt from antitrust coverage. 2 If she would exempt
these monopolies but include others founded on superior skills alone, it is
highly debatable whether it will even be in the public interest to dissipate
their power.
The firm whose "monopoly" position is the result of superior perform-
ance alone should be a source of pride, not a target. It is the best kind of
winner that economic competition can produce. As long as such a firm
avoids restrictive practices and serves the consumer well-i.e., offering
customers a good price-quality balance-it will remain dominant. If a
competitor can improve on this balance, the monopolist's position will
erode. If not, the competitor's offering is not truly competitive, and the
monopolist will prevail. In other words, the monopolist's price will be the
competitive price so long as restrictive practices are not involved, and its
product or service remains the best available. This price, or limit price, will
reflect the probability of entry to maintain the proper balance.3 This is not
monopoly power in the antitrust sense.
Bork properly observed that the best way to safeguard consumer wel-
fare is to encourage such entrepreneurial effectiveness, not discourage it.3
Areeda and Turnerv concluded that even though the innocent monopolist
may have some discretion in setting price,35 that firm which has achieved
its position through superior skill deserves the protection of a behavior
standard. 6 Moreover, the existence of dynamic markets means that self-
31 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 344, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
(Special Supp.) at 98 (separate statement of Commissioner Fox).
31 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 22, at 623(a)(4).
31 For a similar discussion, see id. at 622(e).
3' COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 172 n.41, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) (Special Supp.) at 46 n.41 (citing Prepared Statement of Prof. Robert H. Bork to the
Commission 3 (Sept. 13, 1978)) [hereinafter cited as Bork Statement].
31 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 22, at 614.
' Id. at 624(d). Areeda and'Turner concluded:
Were we concerned solely with equitable relief against persistent monopolies
not attributable to scale economies, indivisible resources, or legal license, bad be-
havior would be irrelevant, and a rule of presumptive illegality appropriate. But
presumptive illegality is plainly inappropriate for criminal sanctions or treble dam-
ages; blind luck may merit no reward, but neither does it deserve penalties. And
even where only equitable relief is sought, presumptive illegality would give inade-
quate protection to superior skill. Fortuitous factors must be treated in the defen-
dant's favor. One who innocently obtains monopoly will usually have been more
skillful than those he competed against, and we cannot ask for more than a plausi-
ble claim to that effect. Once such a claim is made, presumptive illegality would
have to be modified to impose on the plaintiffs the burden of persuasion that
[Vol. XXXVII
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correcting forces may make market power transient in nature so that mo-
nopoly profits may or may not be earned by the perceived monopolist. As
Scherer has noted: "[W]hile firms with market power may earn monopoly
profits, they need not, especially under the plausible conditions of mono-
polistic competition.""
'7
Taking all this into account, I am left with the impression that the
proposed no-conduct standard can realistically be applied only to those
monopolists which have "substantial and persistent" monopoly power
without superior skill, economies of scale, individual scarce resources, or
lawfully-obtained and exploited patents." Such reasoning brings me back
to my earlier skepticism as to whether this type of monopoly power is really
a widespread economic problem requiring a drastic break from precedent.
I agree with Professor Bork that inevitable and innocent monopolization
is probably more prevalent," and where it is otherwise, the existing Sher-
man Act standards are up to the task. Assuming the-prevalence of innocent
monopoly, the question is whether an arbitrary no-conduct standard is the
appropriate device to mask the shortcomings which may exist in current
trial techniques.
Clearly, in the current wave of protracted economic litigation, there is
a tremendous need for some innovative, socially-desirable improvements.
These improvements will not be achieved by legislating more layers of new
laws or by ramming more cases through the system regardless of due pro-
cess considerations. On the substantive side, antitrust prosecutors and
academicians must test more rigorously and understand economic con-
cepts before urging them as a basis for multi-million dollar lawsuits."
Procedurally, counsel for plaintiffs and defendants must move these cases
more aggressively through the litigation process.
unacceptable behavior made a significant contribution to the monopoly.
So modified, the presumptive illegality approach would approximate the tradi-
tional behavioral requirement, but the traditional approach on balance seems pre-
ferable even though only equitable relief is sought. First, requiring the plaintiff to
plead and prove that the monopoly is based on unacceptable behavior would pro-
mote a more rational and economical use of enforcement resources. It would (1)
deter baseless suits; (2) prolong few, if any, because it would be a rare if not non-
existent case in which the defendant could make no plausible claim of inevitability
or superior skill; (3) shorten the trial of cases where clear proof of bad behavior
eliminates the superior skill issue. Second, requiring proof of bad behavior reduces
somewhat the danger that the prospect of antimonopoly litigation would reduce the
incentives for achieving scale economies or superior skill.
Id. (footnote omitted).
31 SCHERER, supra note 11, at 15.
3 Federal Trade Commissioner Robert Pitofsky conceded that there would probably be
only "one or two" prosecutions per decade raising the no-conduct standard under these
circumstances. Speech by Robert Pitofsky, Columbia Law School Alumni Assn.,'summarized
in Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) A-13 (No. 64, April 2, 1979).
' COMMIssoN REPORT, supra note 5, at 173 n.44, 897 ANTTRusT & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) (Special Supp.) at 46 n.44 (citing Bork Statement, supra note 34, at 5-7).
11 See generally Schmalensee, note 16 supra.
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Another needed reform is a professional commitment that attorneys
will stay with these cases once filed. Otherwise, perpetual motion has
arrived, especially on the government side. New generations of staff will
appear on the scene as their predecessors become discouraged or obtain
better-paying jobs with businesses fearful of similar litigation.4 Each new
staff may introduce a different pet legal concept to make its mark and
argue for time to flesh it out.
Even if one believes that monopoly power is a problem, there are other
good reasons to doubt the wisdom of a no-conduct standard. First, it is
highly debatable whether officials could properly identify those instances
of persistent monopoly power requiring government intervention. In his
separate statement, Commissioner Paul Rand Dixon asserted the propriety
of regulation or remedial action where a single firm "for whatever reasons,
is able to and does charge above-competitive prices for an indefinite length
of time.' 12 However, he also added: "Unfortunately, . . . it is not clear to
me that we as yet have the knowledge to enable us to identify with the
precision necessary for a law of the sort proposed here, those single firms
that are in the position I have described."43
Second, a no-conduct standard may prove inequitable and socially
counterproductive. Commissioner Dixon noted:
A law that permits corporations to be dismembered by the govern-
ment in the absence of abnormal conduct on their part should, at
a minimum, give clear notice to affected parties as to what circum-
stances will trigger its application (so as to permit a corporation
to avoid, legitinitely, the consequences of the law by procompeti-
tive readjustment), while at the same time separating out for cov-
erage (with substantial, if not absolute, precision), only those situ-
ations in which harm is occurring and in which lower prices or
improved performance will result from the drastic relief allowed.
If these conditions cannot be satisfied, the law is likely to be per-
ceived, at best, as capricious and unfair in extreme measure."
Third, a no-conduct monopolization standard would have the effect of
creating perverse disincentives for firms approaching whatever levels of
size, market position, or profitability are finally determined to constitute
a demonstration of "monopoly power." 5 For instance, a firm approaching
the threshholds inherent in the no-conduct standard would have little
incentive to compete aggressively. Some may feel that no harm is really
" The gist of my point is illustrated by the fact that the seven employees designated by
the FTC as 1979 winners of Distinguished Service Awards (the highest honorary award given)
have all left the agency. FTC: Watch, Oct 19, 1979, at 40.
42 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 410, 897 ANTRusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
(Special Supp.) at 116 (separate statement of Commissioner Dixon).
43 Id.
"Id. at 410, 897 ANTIRrUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 116-17.
" See 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 22, at 614, 622.
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done since the firm is noncompetitive even when it is near the threshold.
The problem remains that such a firm may have achieved its status
through superior skill and aggressive competitive behavior rather than
through predatory conduct and, therefore, be competitive.
Honestly competitive behavior will better serve the consumer than gov-
ernment intervention, particularly given the existence of self-corrective
market forces that will erode and eventually destroy monopoly power
where the innocent monopolist is not effectively serving its customers. It
is, of course, possible that an honest monopolist will begin to use predatory
behavior to preserve its position. Current antitrust standards; however, are
wholly adequate to handle this eventuality.
It is a very difficult task to identify the monopolist which has the type
of monopoly power that might lend itself to attack under a no-conduct
standard. So difficult, in fact, that the Commission could never agree on
a definition for persistent monopoly power nor on the basic wisdom of such
a standard. Instead, the Commission passed the entire quandary to Con-
gress. 6 In other words, as a result of a bit of Potomac gymnastics, the body
of antitrust and legislative expertise assembled by the President in the
form of NCRALP has found some of the questions too difficult. Instead
of admitting this, the Commission has virtually forced Congress to spend
its time hearing the same debate that NCRALP has already witnessed.
" The Commission recommended that a congressional inquiry be called based on the
following principles:
(a) The chief goal of the Sherman Act monopolization provision is the dissipation
of' persistent monopoly power;
(b) persistent monopoly power can be presumed to be maintained through delib-
erate conduct that would violate traditional Sherman Section 2 standards;
(c) the current litigation process under Sherman Section 2 does not effectively
remedy persistent monopoly power, in part because the need to prove culpable
conduct leads to much evidence not relevant to the proof of monopoly power or the
nature of effective relief and creates strong incentives for the government to focus
its resources on the liability stage of a monopolization proceeding rather than relief;
(d) the adoption of a standard enabling the government to obtain structural relief
on a showing of persistent monopoly power without the need to prove culpable
conduct would rationalize monopolization litigation in accordance with the preced-
ing principles, but would also raise the following issues, which should be examined
by Congress before any specific statutory change is enacted:
(1) the definition of monopoly power to be applied in using the stan-
dard;
(2) the type and scope of defenses to be permitted and the stage of
the litigation at which they should be permitted;
(3) whether efficiency considerations should be permitted to affect
the availability of structural relief where anticompetitive conduct has
created or maintained the monopoly; and
(4) the advisability of adopting a conduct-free liability standard in
view of possible disincentives to business growth or public perceptions
of unfairness.
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 141-42, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Spe-
cial Supp.) at 40.
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If the experts can't agree, why should laymen in Congress dare to
act-especially when there is reason to believe their actions will do more
harm than good.
